Organization at the Limit: Lessons from the Columbia DisasterISBN: 978-1-4051-3108-7
Hardcover
384 pages
September 2005, Wiley-Blackwell
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“As the influential philosopher Karl Popper observed, to
avoid perishing along with our false theories, we systematically
try to eliminate our false theories, letting them die in our stead.
The Columbia disaster is a stark and tragic lesson in the
consequences of false theories. Using the Columbia disaster
and NASA as its focal points, Organization at the Limit
offers a rich, multifaceted examination that reveals how and why
complex organizations using risky technologies often produce and
sustain false theories. The analysis yields insights indispensable
for those who wish to help such organizations unlearn their false
theories, learn more truthful ones, and avoid the disasters that
lurk beyond their limits.” Joel A. C. Baum, University of
Toronto
“The Columbia disaster has much to teach any
student and manager of organizations. In this marvellous
collection, Professors Farjoun and Starbuck have assembled some of
the most profound and relevant thinking about the hitherto hidden
vulnerabilities of today’s organizations, their sources, and
just how to address them. Readers will be most amply
rewarded.” Danny Miller, HEC Montreal
“The CAIB report was the most sophisticated official
examination of an accident ever. Now we have an exhaustive social
science exploration which amplifies, extends, enriches, and even at
times contradicts the Board’s analysis. A variety of
theoretical perspectives are applied, generating many fresh
insights.” Charles Perrow, Yale University
Howard Aldrich, Review on Amazon:
After two horrible disasters, do you think that NASA has learned
from its mistakes, and that it will never happen again? If so, you
need to read this book! In 18 well-written chapters, the editors
have assembled a set of experts on organizations and disasters to
analyze lessons from the Columbia disaster. Because the Challenger
disaster foreshadowed many of the problems that subsequently turned
up in official investigations of the Columbia disaster, it also
figures heavily in this edited book. The authors demonstrate the
analytic power of an historically informed organizational analysis
of a large governmental agency under strong political pressure to
produce results with limited resources.
Two points in particular caught my eye. First, after the
Challenger disaster, NASA was supposedly reorganized to place
greater emphasis on safety. However, because the organization began
to define the space exploration program as a problem of meeting
production goals and deadlines, "safety" never achieved the
priority in the organization than it deserved. Instead of seeing
the space shuttle program as a developmental one, exploring the
risky frontier of technological knowledge, NASA officials treated
it like any other flight program. Second, as anomalies continued to
crop up after flights, engineers and officials began to think about
deviations from acceptable practices and outcomes as "normal." As
deviation was normalized, unusual events were taken for granted and
didn't provoke the kind of response than one would expect from life
threatening occurrences.
Scholars interested in organization studies, organizational learning, systems theory, and other academic disciplines will learn much from this book. However, one can also hope that public officials will take its lessons to heart and look more closely at the design of other risky systems that are operating close to the limits of our scientific knowledge. Amazon