Free Will and Moral Responsibility, Volume XXIX

2. On an Argument for the Impossibility of Moral Responsibility: Randolph Clark (University of Georgia).

3. Deliberation and Metaphysical Freedom: E. J. Coffman (University of Notre Dame) and Ted A. Warfield (University of Notre Dame).

4. Alienation, Autonomy, and the Self: Laura Waddell Ekstrom (College of William and Mary).

5. Neurobiology, Neuroimaging, and Free Will: Walter Glannon (University of Calgary).

6. Frankfurt-Style Counterexamples and Begging the Question: Steward Goetz (Ursinus College).

7. Freedom, Obligation, and Responsibility: Prospects for a Unifying Theory: Ishtiyaque Haji (University of Calgary).

8. Moral Responsibility and Buffered Alternatives: David P. Hunt (Whittier College).

9. Decisions, Intentions, and Free Will: Alfred R. Mele (Florida State University).

10. Where Frankfurt and Strawson Meet: Michael McKenna (Ithaca College).

11. Freedom, Responsibility and the Challenge of Situationism: Dana K. Nelkin (University of California, San Diego).

12. Freedom with a Human Face: Timothy O'Connor (Indiana University).

13. Defending Hard Incompatibilism: Derk Pereboom (University of Vermont).

14. Free Will and Respect for Persons: Saul Smilansky (University of Haifa).

15. PAPistry: Another Defense: Daniel Speak (Azusa Pacific University).

16. The Trouble with Tracing: Manuel Vargas (University of San Francisco).

17. Blameworthiness, Non-robust Alternatives, and the Principle of Alternative Expectations: David Widerker (Bar Ilan University).

18. More on "Ought" Implies "Can" and the Principle of Alternate Possibilities: Gideon Yaffe (University of Southern California).