Dummett: Philosophy of Language

Fregean Foundations.

Sense and Reference in Frege and Dummett.

Truth Assertion and the Central Argument Against Bivalence.

Frege's Platonism.

Frege's Kantian Connections.

The Context Principle.

Wittgenstein and Quine.

The Manifestability Constraint and Rejection of Mentalism.

Dummett and Quine.

Two Challenges: Holism and Strict Finitism.

The Manifestability Constraint and the Priority of Language.

How do Anti-Mentalism and Anti-Psychologism Stand to Each Other?.

The Influence of Intuitionism .

Brouwer's Intuitionism.

The Intuitionist Case Against Bivalence.

Metaphysical debates and the Theory of Meaning.

The Traditional case for Nominalism and Subjective Idealism.

Moderate Idealism and the Denial of Bivalence.

The Case Against Strict Finitism.

Pure versus Mediated Constructivism: Truth Theories and Semantics.

A Common-Sense Realist Appropriation of the Argument Against Bivalence.

The Reality of the Past.

Anti-Realism with Respect to the Past.

Anti-Realism with Respect to the Future.

What Do We Know When We Know A Language?.

Languages and Idiolects.

Davidson on Malapropism and the Social Character of Meaning.

Psychologism, Phenomenology and Philosophy of Mind.

On the Relationship of Phenomenology to Analytic Philosophy.

How Close are Frege and Husserl on Sense and Reference?.

Wittgenstein and Intentionality.

Conclusion.

Notes.

Bibliography