The Economics of Information: Lying and Cheating in Markets and Organizations

List of Tables.

Preface.

1. Introduction: Private Information and Hidden Action.

Part I: Adverse Selection: The Market for Lemons. .

2. Quality Uncertainty and the Market for Lemons.

3. Adverse Selection: The Wilson Model.

4. Lemons Problems: Experimental Evidence.

Part II: Signalling.

5. Job Market Signalling.

6. Screening: A Self-Selection Mechanism.

7. Further Literature on Signalling Theory.

8. Signalling/Screening Behaviour: Experimental Evidence.

Part III: Moral Hazard.

9. Moral Hazard: Shareholder/Management Relations.

10. Moral Hazard: A Principal-Agent Model.

11. Further Literature on Moral Hazard and Agency Theory.

12. Moral Hazard: Experimental Evidence.

Part IV: Mechanism Design: Applications to Bargaining and Auctions. .

13. Mechanism Design and the Revelation Principle: A Bargaining Example.

14. Auction Design: Theory.

15. Auction Design: Experimental Evidence.

16. Concluding Comments.

Appendix: Brief Notes on Probability Distributions, Baye's Rule, Expected Utility Theory and Game Theory.

Index.